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TINKERING WITH TINKER: APPLYING A NEW TEST TO PEER ON PEER 
BULLYING IN SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
© 2012 January Turner 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the 
State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of 
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not 
perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for 
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the 
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount 
important principles of our government as mere platitudes.
1
 
I. Introduction 
―It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.‖2 This oft quoted mantra from Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District is a common focal point of many issues 
regarding student speech.
3
 However, this principle brings up two complex and important 
questions. First, how far away from the physical bounds of the brick and mortar building does 
the ―schoolhouse gate‖ extend? And more specifically, should a Tinker analysis be invoked 
                                                             
1
 W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). The case considered 
whether the State, specifically the school, could compel students to recite the Pledge of 
Allegiance under penalty of expulsion. The Supreme Court was specifically concerned with the 
spirit of First Amendment protections in compelling student speech through an affirmation to the 
flag.   
2
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Students were 
suspended after wearing black armbands. 
3
 Id. 
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whenever a minor, school-aged speaker is involved, regardless of where the speech takes place? 
The further schools move away from the school environment, the greater risk for constitutional 
violations. While schools are assigned the responsibility for the moral and educational 
instruction of school-age children, they have not and should not be required to infringe on the 
responsibilities of parents. 
II. Tinkering with Tinker 
 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District is the seminal case 
concerning a school’s restriction of student speech.4 In Tinker, a group of students were 
suspended for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.
5
 The Court painstakingly 
examined both the school’s and the student’s interest in this silent protest within the school 
environment.
6
 It also analyzed the competing concerns of maintaining good order and discipline 
within the school compared to permitting students to exercise their opinions on matters of 
perceived importance.
7
 This balancing act has since been coined the ―Tinker test,‖ serving as the 
dispositive instrument for determining whether student speech is protected under the First 
Amendment.
8
 Accordingly, the Tinker test permits a school to restrict student speech only if it 
(1) causes a material interference with the proper and orderly working of a school or the rights of 
others and (2) the interference is substantial.
9
 If a school can establish that substantial and 
material disruption has occurred, a school can presumptively regulate the student’s speech.10 
                                                             
4
 393 U.S. 504 (1969) 
5
 Id. at 504. 
6
 Id at  508-11. 
7
 Id. at 510-11. 
8
 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986). 
9
 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
10
 Id. 
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 When Tinker was argued before the Supreme Court in 1969, there was no such thing as 
the internet or Facebook. More than half a century later, the technology has flourished alongside 
the prominence of its use. In fact, a 2010 survey by the Pew Research Center shows that 93% of 
youths ages 12-17 go online.
11
 These young adults can be subjected to episodes of harassment or 
bullying by another youth, particularly in a school setting where each are students. There is still a 
notion that in order to bully a child, there must be face to face interaction. However, under the 
reality of the technological world, bullying is present in classroom halls, text messages, instant 
messengers and social media such as Facebook. The label given to these types of interactions is 
not as important as the content therein. 
A. Tinker’s Original Intent and Concern 
In order to protect liberties, a person must be willing to exercise rights associated with 
such liberties. Tinker addressed First Amendment protections within the confines of the school 
community. Subsequently, the judicial system has attempted to interpret whether the Court 
espoused either (1) blanket approval to curtail student speech if the speech created a substantial 
and material disruption to the school or (2) a calculated restraint approach to school interaction. 
The multitude of student speech cases exhibit that the lower courts have expressed confusion 
over the appropriate judicial perspective for addressing student speech. 
 1. Blanket Approval to Curtail Student Speech 
 A school presents a microcosm of society. It is a specialized convergence of substantive 
and normative education in a finite environment. Teachers and staff are not only tasked with the 
                                                             
11
 Amanda Lenhart et al., Social Media & Mobile Internet Use Among Teens and Young Adults, 
PEW RES. CENTER PUBLICATIONS (Feb. 10, 2010), available at 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1484/social-media-mobile-internet-use-teens-millennials-fewer-blog 
(last accessed May 20, 2012). 
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responsibility of teaching children the three R’s,12 but also instructing on the normative 
behaviors relevant to our societal norms. In this respect, teachers and staff are more than just 
educators. They are moral compasses and questioners of the norm. There is a precarious balance, 
however, between teaching students what is socially appropriate and emboldening them to 
question and explore in an environment that is protective and nurturing. Consequently, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the school setting is unique and entitled to special 
evaluation when reviewed for constitutional violations.  
 In Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, a female high school student created a 
disparaging MySpace page about a fellow student and was suspended from school for five 
days.
13
 That student, Kara Kowalski, returned home from school and, using her home computer, 
created a discussion group webpage on MySpace.com with the heading ―S.A.S.H.‖14 Out of 
approximately 100 students she invited to join the group, about two dozen joined.
15
 A short time 
later, the group was accessed by one of the invited student from a school computer during an 
after-hours class.
16
 Ms. Kowalski repeatedly made remarks and encouraged her fellow students’ 
attacks on the site of Shay N., a fellow classmate. Shay N.’s father contacted the school shortly 
after the pictures were posted on the website to have the derogatory website removed. The school 
determined that Kowalski had created a ―hate website‖ and gave Kowalski a five day out of 
school and 90 day ―social‖ suspension which prevented her from participating in social events at 
the high school.
17
 
                                                             
12
 Writing, Reading, and Arithmetic. 
13
 Kowalski v. Berkeley County Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 569 (4th Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1095 (2012). 
14
 Id at 567.   
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. at 568. 
17
 Id. at 568-69. 
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In determining that sanctions were permissible, the Fourth Circuit zeroed in on the 
Supreme Court’s language in Tinker stating that regulation could be ―justified by a showing that 
the students' activities would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school.‖18 However, its finding that this aspect of the Court’s holding ―supports the conclusion 
that public schools have a compelling interest in regulating speech that interferes with or disrupts 
the work and discipline of the school, including discipline for student harassment and bullying‖ 
is speculative. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the belief that schools should not be 
concerned with where the behavior occurred, only that the behavior had a substantial and 
material effect on some aspect of the school environment.
19
 The Court of Appeals endorsed the 
school reaching into the home and punishing a student for behavior that she conducted 
completely apart from the school – a radical departure from student speech jurisprudence. 
 2. Calculated Restraint 
 Conversely, Supreme Court precedent has utilized a different approach to First 
Amendment rights within the school environment. Rather than offering blanket approval of 
curtailment, it has employed a deliberate balancing test in advocating a view of calculated 
restraint.
20
 The Court has taken great pains in cases since Tinker to ensure there is a sufficient 
nexus to the school.
21
 This weighing reflects the Court’s concern with establishing the proper 
balance of administrative control of the educational process and supporting expression of 
youths.
22
 
                                                             
18
 Id. at 573. 
19
 Id. 
20
 See Morse. v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 
260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
21
 Id. 
22
 Paul Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools: Tinker Distinguished; 59 GEO. L. J. 
37, 51 (1970). 
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  a. On or Off Campus Distinction 
 Under the misguided notion that the Tinker Court intended such an analysis to be relevant 
in determining whether a First Amendment violation has occurred, much discussion has centered 
upon whether the speech in question occurred on or off campus. The actual terminology from the 
Court asserts that ―conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-whether it 
stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial 
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of speech.‖23 This is the key area overlooked by subsequent courts and is 
the majority’s context of the observation.  
In Tinker, the Court did not want to limit a principal’s authority to the actual classroom 
environment.
24
 Speech that is conducted in conjunction with a school activity or event is still 
deemed to be within the school environment, even when it is conducted outside the school 
grounds but still within the school’s control.25 Conversely, in Porter v. Ascension Parish School 
Bd., a student’s violent drawing of the principal was found by the Fifth Circuit to be non-
punishable by the school district because it was drawn off-campus at his home, shown to family 
members and friends within the home and hidden in a book in the closet.
 26
 It was undisputed that 
rather than purposely bringing the drawing into the school environment, the introduction of the 
drawing to the school was wholly accidental and unconnected with the student’s earlier display 
of the drawing to members of his household.
27
 
                                                             
23
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
24
 Id. 
25
 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 400. The event occurred during normal school hours. It was sanctioned 
by Principal Morse ―as an approved social event or class trip.‖  
26
 Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 617 (5th Cir. 2004). 
27
 Id. 
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Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, a case involving a student who used a school 
nominating speech at a school assembly to deliver lewd and sexually suggestive communication, 
specifically addressed the question of on versus off campus behavior. The Court noted that 
similar behavior conducted outside the school environment would have been wholly protected 
speech under the First Amendment.
28
 However, the Morse v. Frederick Court, considering 
whether a student’s ―BongHits4Jesus‖ banner hung across the street from the school was 
protected speech under the First Amendment, did not even consider the location of the student 
speech as an important factor.
29
 In Morse, high school students were released from class to watch 
the Olympic torch relay passing through town.
30
 The students were supervised by teachers during 
the relay and the school characterized the event as school sponsored.
31
 The student stood across 
the street from the school and unfurled a banner with the phrase ―BongHits4Jesus‖ clearly visible 
to those on the school campus – he was subsequently punished by the administration for his 
action.
32
 The Court classified the banner hanging as a school speech case, compelling it to assess 
the punishment under the Tinker test.
33
 Further, the issue of drug use and abuse is an 
―important—indeed, perhaps compelling‖ interest.34 Consequently, the physical location is not 
determinative of a First Amendment violation under the Tinker test. However, the location of the 
speech should be a factor if schools intend to use the test to infringe on speech wholly outside the 
school environment.  
                                                             
28
 Morse, 551 U.S. at 405. 
29
 Id. at  403 (―The question thus becomes whether a principal may, consistent with the First 
Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as 
promoting illegal drug use. We hold that she may.‖).  
30
 Id. at 397. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Id at 400-01. 
34
 Id. at 407. 
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B. Materially and Substantially Infringe With the Work of the School 
 With the exception of the Morse ruling, the Supreme Court has consistently held that a 
school must prove a material and substantial interference with the work or discipline of a school 
to restrict student’s freedom of speech.35 The Court’s concern with the distinct microcosm of a 
school – the responsibility and duty to teach and protect – provides a framework for analysis.36 
Schools have to maintain control over a large number of children during prescribed hours. Those 
children come from a variety of home and societal situations. Even outside of pedagogical 
flexibility, schools require the ability to discipline students for behavioral missteps in order to 
maintain a proper environment for learning. 
 In contrast, the Tinker Court did not think the interference could be an ―undifferentiated 
fear or apprehension of disturbance.‖37 Neither the Court nor society wanted a legion of 
followers who simply did what they were told and toed the line. The potential creation of 
―enclaves of totalitarianism‖ was seen as the ultimate affront to the constitutional rights of the 
people, even those under the age of majority.
38
 
Unfortunately, the material and substantial interference standard advanced by Tinker can 
be hard to utilize. For example, in Saxe v. State College School District, where a student and the 
student’s guardian challenged the anti-harassment policy of the school district prohibiting the 
plaintiffs from speaking out against homosexuality, the Third Circuit found that ―harassment‖ is 
                                                             
35
 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 265 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986). 
36
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. 
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not a categorically-prohibited area of speech.
39
 In Cohen v. California,
40
 however, a case in 
which a man was prosecuted for wearing a ―Fuck the Draft‖ jacket into the local courthouse, the 
Court reminded that a curtailment of speech must be more than a mere ―desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.‖41 As a result, 
controversial speech can easily be determined to constitute impermissible harassment in one 
court but merely an expression of unpopular beliefs, and therefore protected, by another. 
Considering that the manner or manifestation the disturbance can take is evaluated on an ad hoc 
basis, such confusion and lack of consistency is likely to occur. 
Under the current standard then, it appears the court must evaluate (1) the classification 
of the activity – whether the activity is during or endorsed by the school, (2) whether the 
―speech‖ is individually directed or whether there is an effect on the general student population, 
and (3) whether the ―speech‖ invades the right of others. As will be discussed below, the 
balancing of the preceding factors could create a more manageable approach to student speech 
cases. The amount of weight to be given to these factors is not evident from the current case law.  
1.  Focus on School Activities or Endorsement 
 The location of the student speech is very important –  seminal cases decided by the 
Supreme Court, in addition to subsequent lower court decisions, involve speech that took place 
either within the bricks and mortar of the school environment or at a school sanctioned event. In 
Morse v. Frederick, the students were allowed to attend a torch ceremony passing through their 
                                                             
39
 Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2001). Schools may not 
regulate deeply offensive and potentially disruptive categories of speech based, at least in part, 
on subject matter and viewpoint. 
40
 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (finding that a jacket with the phrase ―Fuck the 
Draft‖ was protected speech under the First Amendment). 
41
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
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Alaska town.
42
 The school had released the students but required teachers and staff to continue to 
monitor student behavior.
43
 Because the activity was being overseen by the school employees, 
the event took place during school hours, and the questioned speech was directed at the school, 
the Court had no problem classifying the banner as school speech.
44
 Cases involving student 
publications can also raise the issue of whether the school may punish the same. In Boucher v. 
School District of Greenfield, an underground student newspaper was created off-campus and 
was still subjected to the Tinker student speech test.
45
 Although the underground paper was not 
created on campus grounds, it was distributed in school bathrooms and lockers.
46
 The paper 
advocated on-campus action and, as such, was distinguishable from off-campus publications 
brought on campus for distribution.
47
 Yet, still other cases have found that speech deliberately 
kept off-campus retains the full protection of the First Amendment. In Thomas v. Board of 
Education, Granville Central School District, where a satirical newspaper was created by 
students off-campus had ―de minimis‖ interaction with the school, the Third Circuit found the 
                                                             
42
 Morse. v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 297 (2007). 
43
 Id. Students were allowed to leave class to observe the relay from either side of the street. 
Teachers and administrative officials monitored the students' actions. 
44
 Morse, 551 U.S at 400-01 (―The event occurred during normal school hours. It was sanctioned 
by Principal Morse ―as an approved social event or class trip,‖ App. 22–23, and the school 
district's rules expressly provide that pupils in ―approved social events and class trips are subject 
to district rules for  student conduct,‖ App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a. Teachers and administrators 
were interspersed among the students and charged with supervising them. The high school band 
and cheerleaders performed. Frederick, standing among other JDHS students across the street 
from the school, directed his banner toward the school, making it plainly visible to most 
students.‖). 
45
 Boucher v. School Bd. of School Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 828-29 (7th Cir. 1998). 
46
 Id. 
47
 Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979); see also 
Bystrom By & Through Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Minn. 
1987), aff'd sub nom. Bystrom v. Fridley High, 855 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1988) (student expression 
case law applies where unofficial newspaper distributed in lunch room); Pangle v. Bend-Lapine 
Sch. Dist., 10 P.3d 275, 285-86 (Or. App. 2000) (same, with on campus distribution of 
underground newspaper). 
11 
 
school exceeded the boundaries of the school and violated the students’ constitutional rights by 
restricting dissemination of the work and suspending the students for five days.
48
 The court 
found the school could not reach into the home of the parents to control the students’ speech 
when a concerted effort was made to keep the speech separate from the learning environment.
49
 
2. General Population versus Individualized Effect? 
 A clear differentiation that can be drawn in much of the student speech context is whether 
the speech is specifically directed at an individual student or whether there is a generalized 
effect. Tinker considered the impact on the majority of students to a group of students’ passive 
protest of the Vietnam War.
50
 Later, Morse considered the impact of promoting drug use to the 
school’s general population in analyzing whether a banner was protected speech.51 In Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier, the school district censored students’ submissions to the school 
newspaper concerning issues on divorce and pregnancy.
52
 In Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser, the Court was concerned with a sexually suggestive speech given at a school assembly.
53
 
The common analysis in each of these cases centered on the impact of a particular student’s 
                                                             
48
 Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050 (2d Cir. 1979) (―[B]ecause school officials have ventured out of the 
school yard and into the general community where the freedom accorded expression is at its 
zenith, their actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind government officials in the 
public arena.‖). 
49
 Id.  
50
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-11 (1969). 
51
 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007). 
52
 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 260 (1988). Pursuant to the school's 
practice, the teacher in charge of the paper submitted page proofs to the school's principal, who 
objected to the pregnancy story because the pregnant students, although not named, might be 
identified from the text, and because he believed that the article's references to sexual activity 
and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students.  
53
 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1986). 
12 
 
speech on the larger population of the school.
54
 Consequently, a finding of substantial disruption 
is often easier to show when the speech is directed at the general population. 
 However, the Supreme Court has not specifically held that a school can exercise control 
of a student’s speech when conducted off campus in a non-school sanctioned event. In Doninger 
v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit considered the First Amendment rights of a student prevented from 
running for Senior Class Secretary.
55
 The student created a blog post, posted from her home 
computer but partially created on a school computer, criticizing the school’s handling of a battle 
of the bands.
56
 The court stated that the issue of a school’s ability to sanction the student did not 
need to be addressed because the school had qualified immunity as the law governing a student’s 
free speech protections in off-campus speech was not clearly established so as to put the school 
district or principal on notice.
57
 Further, in Thomas v. Board Of Education, Granville Central 
School Dist., the Second Circuit found that the purposeful avoidance of introducing a student 
developed newspaper to the school campus made school punishment unconstitutional.
58
 In the 
original appeal and rehearing of Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, the 
Third Circuit found that without the requisite material and substantial interference, which even 
the school district conceded was not present, the school could not extend its educational control 
into the home of the student in order to punish him for the speech.
59
 The court required a finding 
of a nexus between the student speech and the school in order to restrict such expression, 
                                                             
54
 See also Brown ex rel. Brown v. Cabell County Bd. of Educ., 714 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 
(S.D.W. Va. 2010) (student expelled for writing ―Free A-Train‖ on his hands).  
55
 Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 338 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
56
 Id. at 346 (―[The] Supreme Court has yet to speak on the scope of a school's authority to 
regulate expression that, like Avery's, does not occur on school grounds or at a school-sponsored 
event.‖). 
57
 Id. 
58
 Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979). 
59
 Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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specifically holding that allowing the school to reach into the grandmother’s home to punish the 
student would establish an ―unseemly and dangerous precedent.‖60 
 The recent shift in lower court holdings towards restricting off-campus speech by schools 
can be attributed to a more rational assessment of a school’s role in punishing student speech that 
occurs off-campus. The reason for the shift may be a more reasoned approach to the original 
intent of Tinker. When decided, it was designed to allow schools, tasked with addressing student 
speech within the confines of the school environment, to exact a level of control. Further, schools 
must also make determinations that may weaken their effectiveness and ability to discipline if 
certain speech is not curtailed. If a child posts statements on their home computer encouraging 
other students to behave a particular way in school, there may be a material and substantial 
interference with the school and an invasion into the rights of others, but it will still be afforded 
constitutional protection. For example, a student who posts on Facebook that ―everyone should 
purposely ignore or harass student X‖ may create a substantial and material disruption. However, 
it would be undesirable to allow our schools to hold that a child telling another child not to speak 
to a certain third child is punishable with suspension or expulsion if done completely outside the 
realm of the school. Consequently, such speech should be protected. Additionally, as the normal 
course of social correction is still available in schools, unacceptable behavior can nevertheless be 
corrected without judicial interference. 
3. Invasion of the Rights of Others 
 Decades of First Amendment precedent has shown that the Supreme Court is not willing 
to trample the rights of a few in order to protect others from the words of a few.
61
 The Court’s 
                                                             
60
 Id. 
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stance is that ―the Constitution does not guarantee citizens a right entirely to avoid ideas with 
which they disagree. It would betray its own principles if it did; no robust democracy insulates 
its citizens from views that they might find novel or even inflammatory‖62 has been tested in 
limited respect. The Court’s balancing has centered on the speaker’s constitutional rights 
weighed against the school’s ability to maintain good order and discipline within its confines. 
The rights of others have only been peripherally addressed in the context of discrimination on the 
basis of race or sex. 
III. No Clear Picture for Peer on Peer Bullying Online: How Far From The Brick and 
Mortar? Applying the Pickering Test to Student Speech 
 As explained above, the curtailment of student speech within the traditional bounds of the 
schoolyard has been defined by the Supreme Court but has resulted in varied application by the 
lower courts. In fact, the uncertainty involved in student speech leaves questions for the bully, 
the victim, and the families. As a parent, the uncertainty can breed frustration with the school 
which, in turn, interferes with the educational process for all involved. The Tinker Court stated it 
would not address speech by students that compromised the rights of others to be secure.
63
 Peer-
on-peer bullying in social media is the very type of expression the Court delegated to later 
adjudication. However, such restriction staunchly abuts other students’ rights to speak their mind 
without censorship by the government.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
61
 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, (1971); Morse. v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
62
 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Endow, 542 U.S. 1, 44 (2004). A father of a student brought 
suit to prohibit the school district from using the Pledge of Allegiance in schools because of the 
words ―one nation, under God‖. The father, an atheist, claimed that even though there was an 
opt-out provision, the term exposed his child to speech that he did not believe in. 
63
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
15 
 
The same special environment of a school is applicable when restricting a teacher’s right 
to speak freely.
64
 In Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, the 
Court analyzed a teacher’s First Amendment right to speak out after a vote concerning his 
employer’s handling of school funds through an editorial letter.65 The Court once again 
emphasized the unique environment of a school and developed the Pickering test to analyze 
whether teacher expression can be limited.
66
 The test is a  ―sequential five-step‖ inquiry which 
considers: (1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the plaintiff 
spoke as a private citizen or public employee; (3) whether the plaintiff's protected speech was a 
substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action; (4) whether the State had an 
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from other members of the general 
public; and (5) whether the State would have taken the adverse employment action even absent 
the protected speech‖.67 As is discussed below, instead of a continued reliance upon Tinker, 
subjecting student speech to this test may be a more effective approach. 
A. Public Concern 
In Snyder v. Phelps, the Fourth Circuit held that a court should determine whether a 
matter is of public concern by ―examining the content, form, and context of such speech, as 
revealed by the whole record‖68 with no clearly delineated constraints.69 Everything from 
                                                             
64
 Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will County, Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 571 
(1968) (dismissal of a teacher for criticizing the school board after a bond election for the 
perceived disproportional sports expenditures through an editorial letter to the local paper). 
65
 Id. at 572. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F. 3d 954, 961 (2011). 
68
 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 220 (4th Cir. 2009), aff'd, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
69
 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011). 
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excessive spending on athletics,
70
 criticism of official conduct,
71
 and even the protesting of 
America’s acceptance of gays72 has been labeled a public concern. In conducting the analysis, a 
court must not evaluate the speech in a vacuum; instead, it should be examined in context of the 
person and place that it was made.
73
 In the case of student speech that is conducted solely off-
campus on a social network, it is reasonable to argue that such communication is matter of public 
concern. However, it could also be legitimately argued that peer-on-peer bullying via social 
networking sites is solely ―private speech.‖74 As such, the bullying would be afforded the same 
protection an adult would receive in a libel suit.
75
 As evidenced in the Phelps case, what is of 
public concern has become so broad that just about any topic can be incorporated. As a result, 
victims of bullying would face the burden of classifying attacks as private speech. 
B. Private Citizen vs. Student 
 In applying the Pickering test to students, a finding that the speech is of public concern is 
not dispositive of whether it is protected. A court will also have to consider whether the speech 
was conducted as a private citizen or as a student. Although the determination is not as clear as 
in an employment setting, it can certainly be accomplished with a similar degree of effectiveness. 
In such a situation, the court looks to whether the context of the speech was performed in an 
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employee’s official capacity or with a special knowledge not available to the general public.76 
When a person speaks on matters of public concern, the speaker must have no more knowledge 
of the information discussed than the general public does.
77
 When the same person speaks with 
knowledge obtained by their work for the school, the speech moves away from speaking as a 
general citizen and more into an agent of the school.
78
 In a student speech scenario, a court may 
look to whether the speech involved events or issues pertaining to the speaker as a student. If the 
source of information brings the speech within the school environment, the scales of justice 
could weigh more towards allowing schools to act on the behavior under a Pickering analysis. 
C. Speech as the Motivating Factor for Punishment 
 The third factor in balancing a student’s First Amendment rights and a school’s discretion 
to punish behavior is determining whether the speech is the motivating factor for the school’s 
punishment. In T.V ex rel. B.V v. Smith-Green Community School Corporation, two high school 
students were suspended from extracurricular activities for posting lewd pictures on the 
internet.
79
 The school district concluded that the creation of the photographs was the cause for 
the suspension, not the posting of such pictures on the internet and was therefore a separate and 
permissible ground for disciplining the girls.
80
 Upon appeal to the district court, however, it was 
determined that the making, publishing and circulating of the photos may qualify as protected 
speech, therefore making the suspension unconstitutional.
81
 As a result, if a school is able to 
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point to a different behavior or reasoning as the dispositive basis for punishment, one that does 
not stem from a contested speech violation, then such punishment is unlikely to be precluded by 
any constitutional considerations.  
D. Justification for Disparate Treatment 
 A school district must be able to explain why peer-on-peer bullying through social media 
is handled differently than if those same words had been expressed to the victim off-campus. For 
example, if a student uses a derogatory name for a student while in his own neighborhood, the 
school district must be able to distinguish between not punishing the student for that speech and 
still exacting punishment for the same conduct expressed via social media. The disparate 
treatment of identical insults would be difficult to reasonably explain. Schools are not in the 
business of addressing bullying incidents after students have left the school or school sponsored 
activity under current precedent – why does curtailing student speech expressed via social media 
differ?
82
 Currently, the answer has not been conclusively resolved by the courts.
83
 
E. Whether the Action Would Have Been Taken Regardless 
 Evaluating whether the punishment would have been applied irrespective of the contested 
speech is closely aligned to whether the school district had other grounds for punishing the 
student. A school’s ability to ―to prescribe and control conduct in the schools‖ is essential to 
smooth and consistent operation.
84
 Providing discretion to the institution to determine the best 
practices for reprimand is nevertheless tempered by the constraints of the Constitution. If 
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behavior falls within areas the courts have delegated discretionary judgment, specifically the 
daily questions of when, where and how to discipline and instruct students for infractions of 
school policies and procedures, then reaching into a student’s home will exponentially expound 
this discretion.
85
 Such an invasion into the home is not only prohibited by First Amendment, but 
a litany of Supreme Court precedent.
86
 
IV. Who is Responsible for Facebook Posts? 
 Facebook and other social media create a special First Amendment problem. The 
question of whom, if anyone, is responsible for the messages of minors that are deemed to be 
offensive or dangerous is particularly difficult to answer. Such messages may be a driving factor 
behind any suicides and self-inflicted injuries among high school students. According to a 2007 
study by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, nearly twenty percent of all female high 
school students contemplated suicide in the last 12 months alone, undoubtedly due in part to 
interaction and messages through social media.
87
 However, schools may not be in the best 
position to solve the problem through punishment. Further, the responsibility of the parent 
cannot be overlooked. 
A. Leave Schools Out of the Argument 
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 Schools are responsible for the protection of children for an average of eight hours, five 
days a week. This number does not account for extra-curricular activities or special events. 
However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that parents retain the right to raise their child 
in the manner they deem appropriate, with few constraints. As early as Meyer v. Nebraska
88
 and 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
89
 the Court has reiterated that the State may not infringe on a parent’s 
right to reasonably control and determine the proper upbringing of their children.
90
 This has 
allowed parents to dictate when and where they will receive education, including the learning of 
foreign languages and remaining in school past the tenth grade. The judicial system has operated 
on the presumption that the parents will act in a child’s best interest and only intervenes when 
the parents’ behavior greatly diverges from accepted health and welfare norms.91 
1. Parental Responsibility 
When a minor child acts inappropriately, critics are usually quick to ask whether the 
parents were negligent in preventing the behavior. It appears that in recent years, parents have 
taken more of a detached approach to their children’s behavior.92 However, there has been a 
recent push for society to intervene in the direction parents have gravitated regarding 
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childrearing.
93
 The use of hateful and harming words can usually be traced back to the child’s 
family life.
94
 Parental responsibility at this level provides a mechanism for determining what is 
acceptable outside of legislation or school intervention. Although not the most prudent course of 
action, a parent’s right to raise their child in the manner they seem fit is a fundamental belief in 
American society and has been staunchly defended by the Supreme Court.
95
 As a result, at least 
from a legal standpoint, how parents choose to raise their children will not be dictated to a 
meaningful extent through legislation or regulation. 
Parental responsibility also requires that parents teach children the impact of words from 
the point of view of both the speaker and the recipient. A school is not the only entity able to 
create teaching moments from bullying. Children may not always heed their parents’ advice, but 
they can certainly listen to it. Instead of passing knee-jerk legislation and invading the protected 
area of the home, a parent can speak to a minor about the cutting power of words. Additionally, 
parents are equally capable of helping children understand that words are simply that - words. 
Such words are only effective at injuring the listener when credence is afforded to the remarks. 
As a parent, these lessons are ones that must be taught children in the home, not the school 
system, Congress, or courts. Parents are ultimately responsible for their children’s behavior until 
the age of majority;
96
 in turn, they must be provided the necessary freedom to develop their 
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children so both parent and child may act in accordance with the law. This same responsibility is 
also found in other areas of law – harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
negligent entrustment, among others.
97
 There is no reasoned rationale to diverge from this 
perspective. 
2. Schools as Loco Parentis 
Asking the school to become loco parentis adds another dimension to the educational 
landscape. Schools have already been tasked with feeding, counseling, and nursing their 
students. In addition, they are being asked to be responsible for the social, moral and substantive 
education of their students. Schools have even been granted the authority to teach students social 
normative behavior.
98
 A problem arises, however, in the fact that America is a conglomeration of 
moral, cultural and ethical configurations. To assign a school district with determining and 
implementing the standard for every child is inviting disaster. The Court has repeatedly 
recognized that schools are tasked with teaching students the importance of our constitutional 
rights and protections.
99
 Regrettably, they can often teach these rights and protections while 
denying the same to the students.
100
 Children cannot be expected to exercise their constitutional 
rights at the age of majority if they have been denied throughout their educational upbringing. 
Students are traditionally taught to be good citizens by voting, being informed, and recognizing 
the rights guaranteed under the Constitution. These lessons are handled differently among grade 
levels, but the overarching policy is to teach students the traditional core values upon which 
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America was founded. Students are given the opportunity to experience these same rights and 
responsibilities through school elections, school hearings and a multitude of other activities.
101
 
Consequently, restricting a student’s free speech rights within the confines of other civic lessons 
will have the impact of stifling speech when the minor is constitutionally encouraged to speak. 
Schools are also in a unique position to have a positive impact in reducing peer-on-peer 
bullying. They can bring an educational aspect to prevention that cannot be addressed on nearly 
as large of a scale outside of the school environment. Social correction is a major part of a 
child’s educational journey as children learn by seeing the reaction of their peers. For example, a 
child who sees another child ostracized by classmates for picking on a disabled fellow student 
would quickly learn that behavior is not acceptable. Furthermore, schools influence the lives of a 
majority of the country’s children. They can incorporate lessons on the effect of words into 
curriculum in a manner that does not infringe on a student’s ability to continue to exercise their 
right to expression. However, schools should not be required to both educate and punish 
behavior that occurs outside the educational setting. The role of the school is to address 
behaviors that occur during prescribed times and locations. Requiring schools to operate outside 
these times and places infringe on the parental control and responsibility for raising children. The 
legislative reaction to the increase in suicides related to peer-on-peer bullying requires schools to 
be responsible for educating and punishing students who engage in speech that is determined to 
constitute such behavior.  
3. Slippery Slope 
Extending school control to social media would set a dangerous precedent for school 
intervention, especially for behavior that is conducted solely removed from the school 
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environment. Simply because the perpetrators or victims are students should not automatically 
make the issue the provenance of the school. Allowing schools to intervene in this setting would 
permit them to step into the parents’ protected area of responsibility in other situations. For 
example, a child who gets bullied by another student in his own front yard, an area removed 
from the bricks and mortar of the schoolhouse or school environment, would potentially be 
subject to school discipline.
102
 This type of bullying is closely correlated to the type of behavior 
at issue in social media expression. Under the Tinker test, society would require the school to 
exact its power to punish the students. However, there is no question that the school does not and 
should not have the ability to punish either child.
103
 This has, and remains, the responsibility of 
the parent of the child to address. 
B. If Not Schools, Then Who? 
 School punishment is not the only recourse for the subjects of bullying – parents and 
victims have access to the criminal and civil judicial system. In contrast to schools, the courts 
have unquestioned, legally-recognized power to impose punishment as statute allows. However, 
authorizing the educational system to enforce the current judicial test for school speech outside 
the school system would weaken the effectiveness of other remedies. Even then, expecting 
school administrators to make consistent judgments when legally-trained courts still cannot do so 
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is a recipe for disaster. The potential for infringement upon constitutional rights and protections 
is enormous under such a scenario. Although there is an understandable reluctance to criminalize 
the misguided behavior of the immature, it is clear that the issue cannot be ignored. The question 
of who is responsible for preventing hurtful words from creating real tragedies is a multi-
disciplinary problem for future scholars to address. However, to assign such responsibility to 
school districts based merely on the fact that the speech involved a student is certain to invite 
constitutional inconsistencies. 
Further, schools will be asked to make determinations that may weaken their 
effectiveness to discipline. Schools should not be put in the position to say that a child telling 
another child not to speak to a certain third child, all done while off school grounds, is 
punishable with suspension or expulsion. The normal course of social correction is still available 
in the school system – unacceptable behavior will be corrected on its own without school 
interference. In addition, parents and students still have access to courts for protection. 
V. Conclusion 
 Schools are a unique environment. They are filled with children possessing immature 
moral compasses and limited common sense. Students are feeling out their place in the larger 
world and testing the boundaries of what is acceptable and what will result in a positive self-
affirmation. The Supreme Court’s school speech jurisprudence has remained confined to the 
school environment or activities endorsed by the school. This has left a glaring whole when 
addressing bullying in light of modern technology. Students do not need to be face-to-face in 
order to inflict a verbal assault on the other person. That same assault can now be effectuated 
through social media, text, or other electronic devices. 
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 Schools are overwhelmed with the day to day education and protection of an enormous 
number of children despite an overall reduction in staff per capita.
104
 In light of this burden, 
requiring schools to control the behavior outside school hours or sponsored activities is an 
unrealistic liability. Society has not delegated schools the authority to parent children within their 
own homes. This provenance is illustrated by the unquestioned responsibility of parents to raise 
their child without the interference of the state. This is not to say that the parents of victims are 
left without recourse for bullying, however. Parents are able to engage both the criminal and civil 
justice systems to counteract perceived and actual threats. Furthermore, the educational aspect of 
schools is available to instruct without creating criminals out of children. 
 If the judicial system insists on involving schools in the punishment of off-campus 
student speech, a better approach would be something akin to the school employee speech test 
set out in Pickering. This analysis would allow the court to evaluate the student’s speech rights 
and only intervene when such rights are overwhelmed by the school’s responsibility for 
maintaining discipline and appearances. Current judicial precedent is ineffective for addressing 
peer-on-peer bullying in social media and will require a new perspective that incorporates both 
the location of the speech as well as the effective of the speech within constitutional parameters. 
Until then, courts will be forced to tinker with tests that cannot resolve the true issue at hand. 
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